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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
words "and his heirs" necessary at common law for the creation
of a fee-simple. Any supposed intention of the parties to the
contrary cannot penetrate the stone wall of intentions technically
expressed.
-ROBERT T. DoNm.Y.
TAXATION - REvOCABLE TRUSTS AND INCOME TAX EVASION. -
The plaintiff created trusts in December, 1922, in favor of her
daughter and her nephew, for the duration of the life of the set-
tlor or of the beneficiaries or of the minority of the latter, which-
ever period should first expire, the settlor being one of the two
trustees. The income was to be paid to the beneficiaries in the
discretion of the trustees or to the settlor for the use of the bene-
ficiaries. The settlor reserved "the right to revoke the trust es-
tate prior to the determination thereof, upon and at the expira-
tion of twelve months and one day after notice of revocation as
hereinafter set forth". In 1928 the trusts terminated upon the
attainment of majority by the beneficiaries and on the next day
new trusts were set up on the same terms for the life of the bene-
ficiary or the settlor, whichever proved shorter. The settlor was
taxed on the income for the year 1928 and on appeal the court
held that such tax was improper under the statute set out below,'
Augustus N. Hand dissenting. Langley v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue?
The device of a revocable trust is but one of many used by
persons who wish to avoid a. surtax by dividing the income in such
a way that such divisions fall into the lower brackets of the rate
scale, thus securing a lower tax rate and in some cases complete
evasion of any tax whatever, while at the same time substantial
enjoyment of the income is retained in the settlor. Another device
is the formation of a partnership by the husband including the
wife and minor children. The income is equally divided and each
files a separate return thus avoiding the higher tax rate. In some
instances stockholders in a corporation set up a partnership, com-
posed of their wives, which is used as a selling agent for the cor-
poration, thereby reducing the profits of the corporation which
1 "Where the grantor of a trust has, at any time during the taxable year,
either alone or in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary of the trust,
the power to revest in himself title to any part of the corpus of the trust,
then the income to such part Qf the trust for such taxable year shall be in-
cluded in computing the-net income of the grantor". Revenue Act 1928, §
166, 45 STAT. 840, 26 U. S. C. A. § 2166 (1926).
61 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
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the husbands would have reported as dividends. A substantial
part of this income thus goes to the partnership where it becomes
distributable to the wives who file separate income tax returns.
A more clearly colorable method is the so-called "wash sales" of
stock. In this instance the sale is made to the wife of the holder
at a certain price and immediately such stock is re-purchased at
a much lower figure and the difference is reported as a deductible
loss thus diminishing the amount of taxable income. This device
has been substantially outlawed by statute.'
Though a taxpayer may go the full limit of the law to avoid
or minimize taxes,' there are many points where no clear line
marks the boundary. So it was in the principal case since the set-
tlor could evade the statute entirely every other year and still
have substantial control of the principal and income by giving
the required notice and, after the determination of the trusts,
executing anew the same type of agreement. To forestall this very
possibility Judge Hand insisted that the clause "at any time dur-
ing the taxable year" qualified the word "power" rather than the
words "to revest".' In Clapp v. Heiner the court held the in-
come taxable to the settlor who had provided that the trust might
be revoked upon six months notice, but the very fact that there
the revesting might occur in the tax year during which the power
was exercised distinguishes that case from the present one.
In a situation like the principal case the practical avenue of
escape is by amendment of the statute. This would relieve the
court of the temptation to exceed the legitimate limits of statutory
construction in order to prevent tax evasion." As a matter of fact
045 STAT. 826, § 118 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 2118.
'Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473 (1916).
rSection 219 (g) of the bill as it originally came from the House of Repre-
sentatives read: "Where the grantor of a trust reserves 4 power of revocation
which if exercised would revest in him title to the corpus of the trust then
the income of such trust shall be included in computing the net income of
the grantor." The Senate Committee reported that: "The subdivision of
the House Bill has been re-written in order that there shall not be taxed to
the grantor the income of a trust as to which the grantor has a power of
revocation subject, however, to a condition which has not yet happened."
Judge Hand insisted that the condition meant is one of substance and not a
mere notice of an intention to revoke which amounts to an exercise of the
power itself.
851 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
As a practical matter it would seem that the natural meaning of the sen-
tence requires the entire phrase "power to revest" to be taken as an in-
separable unit and not broken apart as was done in the principal case. Such
reading of the words then clearly sustains the result reached by the majority.
The fact that the income could be paid to the settlor for the use of the
beneficiaries may explain in part the fact that Judge Hand was at some
pains to work out a rational construction of the statute which would prevent
the settor from escaping liability.
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such statutes can be and have been quickly and easily amended.'
It would probably suffice to provide that the income should be
taxed to the settlor if he could revest title in himself within a
period deprivation of the income of which would be a substantial
economic loss to the settlor. Three years may be suggested as an
appropriate length for the period.
-FREDERICK H. BARNETT.
TRUSTS - POWER OF COURT TO REQUIRE TRUSTEE IN DEED OF
TRUST TO INSURE. - Pending a chancery suit charging usury in
loans secured by a deed of trust for the benefit of creditors, the
chancellor upon the suggestion of the trustee ordered him to pro-
cure insurance on buildings covered by the trust deed, which con-
tained no provision for insurance. The order constituted insur-
ance premiums part of the cost of the suit. The trustee insured
for one year but the buildings were destroyed by fire one day
after the expiration of the policy, and before the usury proceed-
ing was finally settled. The grantor of the deed of trust, pur-
porting to act for himself and the beneficiaries thereunder, sought
to hold the trustee liable for the failure to renew the policy. A
decree overruling a demurrer to the bill was reversed on appeal.
The court held, in effect, that the decree requiring insurance was
void for the want of jurisdiction. KHle v. Forman.'
From the facts as stated in the opinion, it seems that the
court could have disposed of the case on the ground that the
grantor was not a proper party to bring suit. For if the grantor
had parted with his title, conveying to the trustee absolutely, the
trustee's obligations were only to the beneficiaries; and on the
other hand, if the conveyance were a deed of trust in the nature
of a mortgage, the grantor remaining in possession and control,
as apparently he did, the trustee owed him no fiduciary responsi-
bilities, except those expressly designated in the trust instrument.2
But as between a beneficiary and a trustee, the latter owes
'Thus on March 2, 1931, the Supreme Court -decided that the estate of a
settlor had been improperly taxed. A bill to amend the statute was intro-
duced into the House of Representatives the next day, was passed unanimous-
ly by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President on the same
day. See note (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 438.
1167 S. E. 744 (W. Va. 1933).
2In the absence of agreement or covenant no relation of trust or con-
fidence exists between the beneficiary and trustee on one side and the grantor
of a deed of trust on the other. Summers v. County of Kanawba, 26 W. Va.
159, 171 (1885).
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